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Farm Policy: Justifications,
Failures and the Need for Reform
Thomas Gale Moore
GRICULTURE is a very important sector of the
U.S. economy. It accounts for about 18 percent of our
GNP, a share larger than manufacturing. Because of its
size, policies that affect farm prices and output have
wide-ranging effects, not only on U.S. farmers, but on
foreignproducers amid consumers as well. Forpolicies
with effects this broad, it certainly is important to
understand why they exist and the effects they have.
The general philosophical background behind our
agricultural policy is largely the same as that being
followed in most western countries: to increase the
size and prosperity ofthe farm sector. It is interesting
to note immediately that this philosophy is quite dif-
ferent in Third World countries where the objective is
to tax agriculture. The reason for this philosophy, of
course, is that the small urban population can exploit
the more numerous rural population. In developed
countries, the small agricultural population exploits
the larger nonrural group. These results illustrate the
public choice proposition that small groups are often
in aposition to taxthe more general population.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FARM
POLICIES
The case for government support of agricultural
policies hasseveral justifications. Basically,we goback
to the 1930s, to the Great Depression, for the start of a
major intervention by the federal government into
agriculture. At that time, U.S. agriculture was de-
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pressed by a combination of low product prices, in-
creasing debt burdens and soil erosion due to
drought. A major justification for aiding distressed
farmers wasbased on the idea ofequity. Traditionally,
U.S. society has been based on the idea of a fair
distribution ofwealth. Equity is good. Disparity is bad.
Farm income has lagged behind urban incomes for
many decades, and concern over economically disad-
vantaged farmers lay behind much of the support for
doing something. This is apure income transfer argu-
ment that is becoming less and less tenable as the
absolute size ofall payments rises andthe distribution
of payments, which is based on production, falls
largelyon thewealthy see table 1).Is it equitable today
to transfer $250,000 in deficiency payments to afarmer
when he is worth $2 million?
Another justification for aiding farmers is the hy-
pothesized existence of market failures. In fact, most
of the recent focus on aiding farmers hasbeen not on
agriculture’s relative poverty but the difficulty of man-
aging farms in a risky and uncertain environment. The
assertion is that farming not only is more risky than
other businesses, but mechanisms for hedging that
risk are not available in conventional private markets.
Thus, government programs have been justified in
terms ofreducing risks, especially risks ofnature, such
as drought or flood. Other factors, such as low price
elasticities of demand and supply and biotechnologi-
cal change also contribute to an inherent riskiness
and uncertain environment faced by agricultural pro-
ducers. Wide variation in commodity prices and pro-
duction are offered as evidence to justi~’the design of
price support programs and crop insurance.
Granting that these farming risks exist, however,
does not necessarily justify government intervention.
At a minimum, we should recognize that government
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failure exists and must be balanced against market
failure. For example, the principal reason that a
private-sector mechanism for hedging risks has not
been developed is government’s heaiy involvement in
agricultural affairs. That is, government has provided
price and income insurance to farmers at little or no
cost, and this involvement has acted as a deterrent to
the private sector supply of comparable insurance.
Only recently are option markets being developed that
allow farmers to purchase, in competitive markets,
insurance against price decline.
Moreover, government intervention can often in-
crease, rather than decrease, the agricultural sector’s
risk. Unstable monetary and fiscal policies increase
risk. Trade embargoes, which may be imposed sud-
denly, increase risk. Constant changes in farm policy
increase risk. Studies by the World Bank, for example,
show that protectionism exaggerates fluctuations in
farm prices. Government policies generate huge sur-
pluses, which are stored and overhang the market,
again increasing risk. Once it is recognized that gov-
ernment is not a perfect instrument for correcting
market failures, we should turn to other schemes.
A related element that lies behind many programs is
the idea of preserving “the family farm.” Congress
often talks about the family farm as being the back-
bone of all that is noble and truthful in America. We
can smile a little bit about this, but the small family
farm ispart ofthe ideal Jeffersonian society. The trend
in agriculture, however, is toward fewer and larger
enterprises run like commercial businesses. Most
family farms now earn a significant portion of their
income off the farm; hence, the applicability of this
rationale has diminished. In fact, farm policies, as
currently designed and administered, do very little for
the family farm.
Another rationale for’ government intervention has
been conservation of resources and environmental
issues. There often exists a difference between the
interest of societies at large and farmers in terms of
land use and water resources, pollution, erosion and
conimon property problems. Generally, higher sup-
port prices have induced marginal land into produc-
tion; occasionally, however, programs such as the
current Acreage Conservation Reserve have retired
land from farming. Finally, there has been a concern
about food security and reasonable consumer prices
forfood products. Specifically, subsidies to agriculture
havebeen viewed as away to increase production and,
therefore, lower prices to benefit consumers, particu-
larly low-income consumers. Also, it has been argued
that government intervention in commodity markets
can alleviate temporary supply shortages or provide a
degree of self-sufficiency in agricultural products for
the nation as whole. As we all know, programs have
worked to increase production, but not to lower
prices. Moreover, even if the prices of some specific
commodities are lowered, consumers pay the cost of
increased production or food reserves through higher
taxes.
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RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR OF
FARMERS
Regardless of the particular’ justification for agricul-
tural policies, however, they are currently supported
principally by what economists call rent-seeking be-
havior. Rent seeking might be defined simply as the
personal interest of a vested interest group in getting
more income. In agriculture, many commodity groups
have much to gain from higher support prices, pro-
duction restrictions or quotas and tariffs on imports.
Moreover, potential gains from such restrictions are
large enough to induce groups to organize and incur
the costs of lobbying for their adoption.
Because farm lobbies are very powerful, the results
of rent-seeking behavior by farmers have been quite
predictable. Perhaps most visible is their effect on the
U.S. budgetary exposure. Lastyear (fiscal 1986), the U.S.
government spent some $40 billion on agriculture and
related programs. This is an enormous budgetary cost
that has expanded dramatically in the last few years.
This large cost to the budget has been compounded
by billions of dollars in consumer costs due to higher
food prices. Given theincentives to produce under the
stimulus of large government subsidies, the supply
management bias of current progr’ams has been
doom2d to failure. Stimnulating production with
higher target prices and fighting the predictable sur-
pluses with acreage diversions ensure only higher
taxpayer costs. Restricting output with diversions or
set-asides or controlling quantities of product sold in
fresh or processed form, as under marketing orders,
raises food prices to consumers. Policies that attempt
to r’estrain production through land controls alsohave
the effect of making our farm product less sellable in
the world market and reducing our exports.
THE FAILURES OF FARM POLICIES
Federal farm programs simply have failed to ad-
dress theeconomics ofsocialproblems used to justify
the aid. Farm programs do not reduce risk or reduce
food prices to consumers. Moreover, as shown in
charts I and 2,the billions ofdollars of aid provided is
not targeted to farmers with large debt or cash flow
problems: most farmers under financial str’ess are in
the family-farm class of $40—$100 thousand in aminual
sales, but most payments go to farms with more than
$500 thousand in annual sales. Also, we should not
forget that the benefits of farm programs are capital-
ized into higher asset values so that, in the long rnn,
the only true beneficiaries of farm programs are land-
owners who owned their farms prior to the adoption
of a farm program or an increase in its benefits.
Much ofthemoney spent on agriculture does not go
to distressed farmers, of course, because federal farm
subsidy payments are proportional to production.
The largest farmers gain the largest share; thus, the
government (taxpayer) assistance does not go to those
most in need. In fact, as many of us have read, the
largest farmers, those who get the biggest benefits, are
often the richest: one farmer last year got a check for
$12 million.
Current policy also results in economic waste. Be-
cause the subsidies are tied to production, there are
incentives to overproduce. The stock of surplus com-
modities is left unused or sold at prices below its cost.
Excess production, which must be stockpiled by the
government or dumped onto world mar’kets, imposes
economic losses either through inefficient use of land
or restrictions on production. Domestic and world
prices are depressed as a result of these government
policies, which, of course, is something we are trying
to offsetwith higher loan rates and target prices. It also
is interesting to note that similar policies in other
countries have given their farmers the same signals to
overproduce, generating ever-expanding wor’ldwide
grain surpluses (chart 3). The adverse side effects will
be eliminated only when the incentive to produce for
the government is replaced by incentive to produce
for the market.
Gover’nment policiesalso have led to other dramnatic
effects not directly observable in program expendi-
tures. Studies show that there are large costs ofsubsi-
dized production due to misallocation ofresources in
the economy as awhole: large costs to the consumer,
large financial cost to taxpayers and significant dead-
weight social costs. Agricultural policies result in a
greater’ commitment of resources to that sector than
will be generated in a free market. To subsidize agri-
culture, other sectors are implicitly taxed. Resources
are drawn out of other’sectors, notably industry, to the
agricultur’al sector. Some say that this shifting of re-
sources has contributed to the “deindustrialization
issue.” In fact, some studies suggest that Europe has
sacrificed up to onemillion manufacturing jobs due to
its agr’icultural programs.
Ther’e are also macroeconomic effects. Money amid
commodity mar’kets are linked. Shocks from one mar-
ket spill over into the other’ in terms of price changes
and output. ‘l’hese policies have had a dramatic effect,
for example, on land prices. In some countries, such
as Japan, they’ve had significant effects. Japanese agri-
cultural policies have effectively bid up the price of
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Chart 1
Distribution of Financially Distressed Farms
by Sales Class, January 1, 1986
NOTE: Financially distressed forms are defined as those with debt/asset ratio over 40
percent and negative cash flow.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture
land in Japan and increased housing costs substan-
tially. The European Common Market has developed
programs to subsidize the export of its surplus farm
products and, as aresult, we have the export enhance-
ment program in the United States, which subsidizes
our agricultural exports. So, at this point we are into a
“subsidy war” with the Common Market. Other com-
mercial exporting countries have been caught in the
crossfire of this subsidy war. Recently, we’ve subsi-
dized the Soviet Union in grain sales, and it now will be
true that one can buy grain cheaper in Moscow than
in Chicago. We developed the marketing loan concept
for rice, which effectively subsidizes the export of rice
abroad; this has hurt the market for ‘I’hailand, one of
our major’ allies in Southeast Asia. This war of subsi-
dies now is hurting not only our taxpayers and other
exporting countries, but is benefitting the main im-
porters, such as the Soviet Union. The result is aset of
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Chart 2
Average Direct Government Payments per Farm
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THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
In matters of farmpolicy, as thecomic strip charac-
ter Pogo used to say, “We’ve identified the enemy and
it is us,” Aswe’ve seen, domestic programs have been
justified by avariety of concerns but remain in place
largely because of special economic interests. Al-
though these policieshave resulted in greatand costly
economic distortion, I would suggest that focusing
reform on U.S. domestic farm policies alone, in terms
of their design and cost, has not been afruitful way to
go and won’twork in the future. The U.S. must recog”
nize that our agricultural sector is inextricably bound
with the world’s agriculture trade, economic growth
and policies ofother countries. U.S. farmers and those
interested in farm policy must deal with the fact that
international forces play a critical role in determining
farm prices, income, exports, impor’ts and the health
of our agricultural sector. Due to the pain associated
with government price distor’ting interventions and
the resulting chronic surpluses, the reform ofU.S. farm
programs today is widely considered a necessity.
Moreover, when you start spending the monies we’ve
been spending (the Common Market spent about $23
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Chart 3
Carryover Stocks of Coarse















NOTE: Data are for crop years; 1986/87 data are preliminary estimates.







there is potential for reform of agricultural policies in
other’ countries as well. A brief summary (table 2) of
farm programs in effect in the United States and
abroad clearly indicates there is plenty of reform to be
adopted by all.
Last year at the Tokyo economic summit, wor’ld
leaders agreed that agricultural policies were in need
of reform. The ministerial declaration at Punta Del
Este, which launched the new GAITround of tr’ade
talks, made agriculture a top priority for reform amid
promised to examine both direct amid indirect subsi-
dies affecting international trade. This spring,the sec-
retary general of the OECD released an interim repor’t
on agriculture. It said that “the causes of the
present crisis are rooted in domestic agricultural poli-
cies. Key to reform is emphasis away from price sup-
ports.” The United States has tabled a proposal in the
new GAIT round to eliminate all agricultural subsi-
dies and to allowfree trade in agriculture by the year
2000.
The approach to reform discussed most often is
decoupling. Decoupling removes subsidies from pro-
duction and directs farm benefits to those in need by
giving them income support directly. This approach
does not distort market prices and give false signals to
overproduce; thus, the surplus problems are elimi-
nated. Moreover, the aid is targeted to those in need,
rather than those who merely pr’oduce the most. Fi-
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because, at market-determined prices, farm produc-
tion is their highest-valued use. According to the
OECD, government-induced distortions are the cause
of the problem and only their removal will provide a
cure. Recently, the OECD ministerial met in Paris and
produced a communique on agriculture. That com-
munique also reaffirmed that the cause of the current
agricultural problems is public policy. The policies
that prevent an adequate transmission of market sig-
nals to farmers lead to rising surpluses and dectining
prices and farm incomes. Thus) it is now being ac-
cepted internationally that public policy is a cause of
the chronic surplus.
The communique also provided guidelines for re-
form. First, a long-term objective is to allow market
signals to influence the orientation of production,
which will better’ allocate resources. Second, consid-
eration must begiven tonon-economic factors such as
food security. Third, the communique endorsed de-
coupling, that farm income support should be made
through direct income support targeted to farmems in
need and not hnked to production.
Critics ofsuch proposals argue that the immediate
costs to farmers of dismantling the protection af-
forded by price supports and production controls will
11FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1987
betoo great. Therefore, weneed to knowseveral things
about compensation schemes: how they can ease the
pain of adjustment; how they can counter effective
political opposition to reform; how compensation can
be based on the losses from policy changes; and how
such schemes can be designed to reduce the moral
hazards that might accompany these policy changes.
One example ofhow these compensation issues can
be addressed is the administration’s sugar reform
package that was sent to Congress this spring. In this
package, compensation is to be offered to sugar pro-
ducers over a four-year period of time in exchange for
lower support prices. Compensation will be costly —
in the multiple millions of dollars for’ some sugar
producers — but the distortions and long-mn cost of
sugar programs that could be reduced provide
benefits way in excess of these short-run payments.
And) in fact, it is possible to compensate farmers for
giving up their price supports and at the same time
benefit both consumers and taxpayers.
12